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& Nantucket Is The TheaterOF 
operations
A NEW LOOK AT THE INVASION 
OF EASTERN MAINE, 1814
By
Barry J. Lohnes
During the last year of the War of 1812 the British launched an 
invasion of the Maine District of Massachusetts, capturing a large 
salient between the Penobscot River and the New Brunswick 
border. Few historians have appraised adequately the inability of 
the national and state governments to defend the region of eastern 
New England, nor have they researched carefully the British 
motivations behind the assault. Only through a closer look at the 
defensive errors of the Americans is it possible to realize that the 
British victory, though a tactical success, was a strategic failure. 
The capture of Portland, Portsmouth, and points southward were 
in the grasp of the British; it was one of the most costly mistakes of 
the war to settle for so little.
From geographical and strategic standpoints Maine was very 
dangerously located. The District was enveloped by British North 
American provinces on two sides and its coastal area lay in the 
shadow of the huge British naval base at Halifax. Even though the 
District’s vulnerability had been established with a British invasion 
of the Penobscot region during the Revolution, in 1812 most of the 
seaports east of Boston were without defenses.
Problems regarding the defense of Maine became acute when 
President Jefferson put the Embargo Act into effect in December 
of 1807, in retaliation for the impressment of American seamen. 
The Embargo, which forbade American merchant ships to 
participate in foreign trade, caused economic stagnation in 
Northern New England and prompted a revival of the Federalist 
party in Massachusetts and the District of Maine.1 With the 
Embargo, war with Great Britain became imminent, but it 
appears that political patronage, rather than military expediency, 
dictated the means for defending the region. Federal government 
funds were spent for fortifications in the areas under Republican 
control while the regions of Federalist domination were generally 
neglected.2 To illustrate, three major rivers in Maine, the 
Penobscot, the Androscoggin, and the Kennebec should have been 
defended because they offered the only means of commercial 
transportation in the District; the north-south flow of the rivers 
tended to tie the agricultural, timber, and shipbuilding industries 
to the Boston market. But only the Androscoggin and Kennebec 
areas were defended. Both happened to be Jeffersonian- 
Republican strongholds. In the Kennebec Valley Major General 
Henry Dearborn had established a strong party machine while in 
Lincoln County, at the confluence of the Kennebec and 
Androscoggin rivers, William King had created a stronghold of 
Jeffersonian Republicanism.3 In eastern Maine, where the 
Federalists were in power, the region was left without even rudi­
mentary defenses.4 Outside of a small redoubt at Eastport, the 
38,000 citizens living between the Penobscot River and Passa- 
maquoddy Bay were left without any type of land fortifications.5
Naval defense was non-existent east of Portland, and there were 
no American blue-water warships east of the naval shipyard at 
Portsmouth, New Hampshire. At Portland were stationed nine 
Federal gunboats of an “utterly inferior” class, part of a gunboat 
fleet constructed by the Jefferson Administration as a money­
saving scheme.6 Ironically, the nine gunboats at Portland were 
withdrawn shortly after the war began.7 Interestingly enough, 
the commander of the Portland gunboat squadron prior to the War 
of 1812 was Lieutenant Charles Morris, who was destined to play 
a leading role in the American defeat in eastern Maine.8
When war was declared in 1812 after four years of economic 
decline in the east, the people of Massachusetts and the District of 
Maine demonstrated only lukewarm support for the war effort. In 
some areas the defeatism had reached traitorous proportions. 
Shortly after the outbreak of war, residents of Eastport, in the 
prime smuggling area of Passamaquoddy, voted unanimously to 
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preserve a “good understanding” with the New Brunswick people; 
apparently their economic well-being was more important than 
their patriotism.9
A clash between the Federal government and Massachusetts 
occurred only four days after the declaration of war. The senior 
General of the United States Army, Henry Dearborn, wrote to 
Caleb Strong, Governor of Massachusetts, requesting that forty- 
one companies of militia be activated for the defense of the coast 
east of Connecticut. Strong refused adamantly, complaining that 
the request was in violation of the Act of 1795 which authorized the 
Federal government to activate the state militia forces only in time 
of national emergency.10 In retaliation to Strong’s recalcitrance, the 
Federal government withdrew its regular detachments from 
coastal garrisons in Massachusetts and Maine, leaving only one 
regiment for the defense of the coast between Easport and Cape 
Cod.11 Eventually Strong ordered three companies of Penobscot 
militia to take up positions near the New Brunswick border to 
alleviate the anxiety in that quarter. As it turned out, the motley 
group of irregulars behaved so badly that the citizens sent them 
home.12
The militia in Massachusetts and the District of Maine during the 
War of 1812 numbered 3,000 men but the number was deceiving 
because it was purely a paper organization, lacking arms, training, 
and qualified officers. Only about 2,000 of the militia were 
activated for short periods before the invasion of 1814.13 
Frequently the men were ordered out to muster simply to get their 
names on the roster; after this was done they went home.14 At a 
court martial after the war it was found that some officers 
recruited militia candidates and dismissed them after collecting 
the bounty money.15 In regard to armament, one battalion of 
Norridgewock militia reported only sixty-five men enrolled and 
absolutely no artillery. Similar shortages were found throughout 
the District.16 Indeed, the lack of state support for the militia 
caused William King, commander of the 11th Division of Militia, to 
comment that “no reliance can be placed on the militia, none 
ought to be.”17
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To worsen matters the Federal government hoped to embarrass 
Massachusetts by letting the state fend for itself in defending the 
land from the British. Government policy was summarized 
adequately in a letter written by the Secretary of the Navy which 
read in part: “If a people of a populous place with such powerful 
means of defense . . . will not defend themselves, I see nothing 
to prevent the [British] force from burning everything. . . .”18 
Some of the political leaders in Maine realized that the District was 
being sacrificed because of partisan interests, but they did not 
know how to rectify the situation.19
What is more, the Maine people suffered from the dearth of 
naval defense. Some of the more wealthy merchants were able to 
absorb the business decline but the poorer classes had to struggle 
for existence. Nova Scotian and New Brunswick privateers added 
to the problem by harrassing coastal vessels left defenseless by the 
paucity of United States naval protection. Joseph Leavitt, a barely 
literate Bangor trader, described the situation:
For ten days back we have heard of a great number of coasters—belong­
ing to this river [Penobscot] , being taken by the privateers
Corn & all provisions very scarce & in short, none to be had; people
are in a suffering state. Fishing is now over & there have not been but
very few caught.20
Crop failures added to the problems of farmers transporting 
their produce to the Boston market. Benjamin Robbins, who 
farmed in the Winthrop area, noted that “many have been in want 
of food and necessaries of life on account of the poor crops the 
year last/’21 Niles’ Register described the residents of Maine as the 
“starving inhabitants of the eastward.”22
The inability of the Maine residents to make a living left many in 
a condition of apathy and dejection. As a result, more than a few 
turned to smuggling. Besides the tons of goods exchanged in 
Passamaquoddy Bay, there is evidence that a vigorous overland 
trade existed between Fredericton, New Brunswick, and Bangor, 
where a bountiful assortment of goods was transported in canoes 
over a system of portages. Joseph Leavitt, the unlucky Bangor 
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trader, noted that the smuggling was controlled by customs 
officials, whom he considered to be “custom house pimps” and a 
“hungry set of wolves.”23
During the first two years of war the British welcomed the 
produce that was smuggled into British North America and the 
British Isles. Poor harvests in Great Britain and the Maritime 
Provinces had forced the British to authorize the granting of 
licenses to American merchants.24 But in the spring of 1814 the 
situation changed drastically. With the defeat of Napoleon and 
an increased food supply in Europe, Britain turnedits attentions to 
the war in North America. An aggressive naval officer, Admiral 
Alexander Cochrane, was sent to the American Station with strong 
reinforcements of ships and seamen.25
Shortly after Cochrane took command, he extended the naval 
blockade to include New England, which had been exempted 
from the blockade because of the need for foodstuffs in Britain 
and the Maritime Provinces. At this time there were no specific 
targets selected for assault by the reinforced naval command. The 
War Office and the Admiralty debated whether to attack the Navy 
Yard at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, or Rhode Island. Cochrane 
speculated on first destroying the seventy-four-gun ship under 
construction at Portsmouth, then marching overland to join 
General Prevost near Lake Champlain, thereby dismembering a 
part of New England. Cochrane then considered the occupation of 
Rhode Island and from there striking at points in southern New 
England.26 Both of these plans had merit and if implemented, 
would have forced New England out of the war and Britain would 
have had an overpowering edge at the conference table.
Instead, the British adapted a strategy which was much less 
decisive. Cochrane was to operate against Baltimore or Washing­
ton while Prevost was ordered to advance into New York with 
naval support from Lake Champlain, with the expectation of de­
feating the Americans in a major battle.27 The third assault was to 
take place in eastern Maine where the plans were to “occupy 
. . . that part of the District of Maine which at present inter­
cepts the communication between Halifax and Quebec.”28
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The communications network in British North America 
depended on the overland route between Quebec and Halifax 
because the St. Lawrence River was frozen over from late Novem­
ber to mid-April. General Prevost, the commander in chief in the 
Canadian provinces, sent vital dispatches to Halifax and London 
from Quebec during the winter months. Of equal importance 
was the march of the 104th Regiment of Infantry along the portage 
route to reinforce the endangered British army in Canada during 
February of 1813.29 The value of the portage route was realized 
again in December of 1813 when over 200 seamen were marched 
overland to supplement the undermanned Royal Navy on the 
Great Lakes.30
Actually, there was no military reason for occupying eastern 
Maine to protect this route. The boundary in 1814 was ill-defined 
and except for the passage through Madawaska, the route did not 
touch the present-day boundary of Maine. Furthermore, the 
nearest American troops were over two hundred miles distant. 
Nevertheless, a historian of Madawaska has written that “ma- 
rauaders, poachers, and skirmishers infested the forests of Temi- 
scouata Lake,” causing the British to use armed guards to protect 
the dispatch carriers.31 Apparently the British thought that the 
renegades were American troops or militia, but there is no evi­
dence to support this assumption.
From an economic standpoint, the merchants and officials of the 
Maritime Provinces desired British occupation of eastern Maine 
because American smugglers were gaining about 95 percent of the 
carrying trade along the coast, thus depriving the Provinces of the 
customs duties.32 Also, they believed that eastern Maine had been 
shamefully ceded to the United States after the Revolution as a 
gesture of appeasement at the conference table. Emotions ran so 
high that both the New Brunswick Council and the Halifax 
Committee of Trade petitioned the British government for the 
occupation of eastern Maine; as it turned out, the petitions were 
inportant in the government’s decision to invade the District of 
Maine.33
On June 19, 1814, Admiral Cochrane received orders from the 
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Admiralty to dispatch an amphibious force to capture the island in 
Passamaquoddy Bay. Subsequently, on July 11, the combined 
force secured the surrender of Fort Sullivan at Eastport, without a 
shot being fire. The British commander, Captain Thomas 
Masterman Hardy, suggested to Admiral Cochrane that Eastport 
would serve as an excellent base for ‘"further annoyance of the 
enemy.”43 In the meantime Cochrane had decided that sterner 
measures were necessary in order to bring the war to a close; he 
ordered his commanders to “destroy and lay waste” all gov­
ernment stores and merchant shipping and to “threaten private 
property.”35
Little had been accomplished regarding the defense of the 
District, although sporadic raids had occurred along the coast 
prior to the capture of Eastport.36 Two days before the capture of 
Eastport, the Adjutant General of Massachusetts had somehow 
deduced that the Penobscot region was about to be attacked in 
force. In spite of his apprehension, he ordered only one brigade to 
be put in readiness to muster “in consequence that the enemies 
[sic] cruisers threaten to attack Castine and other towns in its 
neighborhood.”37 But by the time the order was received, Eastport 
had fallen to the British.
Upon hearing that the Passamaquoddy Bay area had been 
captured, Strong allowed General Dearborn to place 1,100 militia 
under Federal command to serve at points along the coast for a 
period of three months. Ironically, once activated, the militia were 
marched off to Lake Champlain, giving credence to Strong’s 
mistrust of Dearborn and the Secretry of War.38 Although there 
were but few remaining Federal troops in Maine, Dearborn 
appointed one of his political friends, Major General John 
Chandler, as their commander. Chandler, who had been a hired 
hand on Dearborn’s farm in Monmouth, may have been skilled in 
elocution but he had few military successes to his credit.39 As 
events would prove, Chandler had no authority to issue orders to 
the militia in the District of Maine.40
Meanwhile, a large British force had been gathering at Halifax 
for the invasion of additional Maine territory. Secretary Bathurst 
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amended his previous order for conquest to include territory 
“more calculated to feel the pressure of war. ”41 The commanders 
of the expedition, Governor John Coape Sherbrooke of Nova 
Scotia and Admiral Edward Griffith, were given ample flexibility 
by Bathurst’s order. But the lack of more direction from the War 
Secretary caused the British to make an onerous error in the 
invasion plans; the commanders overestimated the defenses of 
Maine and thus western Maine was saved from invasion. Griffith’s 
summary of the strategy reveals the error:
The only part of the Coast that could be attacked with any prospect of suc­
cess, is that which lies between the Penobscot River and Passamaquoddy 
Bay; the ports southward and westward of the Penobscot River, being situat­
ed in a populous country; and from all the information we have been able to 
collect, the defenses are too formidable to be attacked with so small a 
force it has been deeded upon that the expedition should go against 
Penobscot. The troops amounting to two thousand five hundred.42
Accordingly, the British commanders settled for an objective with 
no actual strategic value.
On August 26 an armada of sixteen ships left Halifax for the 
invasion of American territory. The commanders first intended to 
occupy Machias but a brig which had been sent out in advance 
sighted the American corvette Adams which was heading toward 
the mouth of the Penobscot. Subsequently, Sherbrooke made sail 
for Castine with hopes of capturing a United States warship. 
Upon arriving at Castine, the British found that the Adams had 
sailed up the Penobscot. After dispersing the few American 
soldiers who held an artillery position at Castine, the commanders 
dispatched six hundred soldiers and marines in sloops and barges 
to search for the Adams.43
The Adams, commanded by Captain Charles Morris, had 
recently returned from an unsuccessful commerce raiding cruise in 
European waters. While heading toward Portsmouth with a 
scurvy-ridden crew, the Adams struck a ledge in Penobscot Bay, 
making the ship unseaworthy. After disembarking the sick crew 
members, Morris maneuvered the ship up the Penobscot, realizing 
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he had been sighted by one of Griffith’s reconnaisance brigs. At 
Hampden, twenty-seven miles north of Castine, Morris ordered 
the Adams dismantled, so that the ship’s damage could be as­
sessed. On September 1, Morris conferred with Brigadier General 
John Blake of Brewer, commander of the First Brigade of 10th 
Division, Massachusetts Militia, regarding the defense of Hamp­
den. Though the local militia were summoned to Hampden, there 
was little cooperation between Morris and Blake. Morris resented 
having to arm the militia with muskets from the Adams, and Blake 
displayed his arrogance by refusing to dig earthworks at the most 
favorable position, between Hampden Academy and the 
Penobscot.44 Furthermore, Morris refrained from assuming 
command of the land defenses, perhaps because he scented a 
disaster in the making.
In any case, Morris was the only man who could have saved the 
situation at Hampden. For some reason he failed to demonstrate 
the aggressive spirit that had highlighted his career. He made no 
plans for the integration of his seasoned seamen and marines with 
the raw militia to bolster their flagging morale. In short, he seemed 
content to allow the untried militia to stand or fall on their own 
merits, without taking into consideration the futility of the Adams' 
defense if the militia line was broken.45
On the cold, foggy morning of September 3, 1814, over 550 of 
Blake’s militia stood unprotected on a sloping bluff stretching 
from the church across the Bangor Road to the banks of the 
Penobscot, just behind the Academy. Three hundred yards north, 
on a high bank of the river, fourteen cannon from the Adams had 
been stationed to protect the corvette, which was in a careened 
position a few feet below Crosby’s Wharf.46 The British force, 
which had landed three miles south of Hampden the night before, 
attacked by land and river; the soldiers and marines forced the 
bluff while barges in the river kept out of cannon range and fired 
Congreve rockets in the direction of the bluff. According to one 
member of the militia, the Americans on the bluff “gave way and 
fled in great disorder" before the British bayonet charge.47 One 
regimental commander of the militia “withdrew himself from the 
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shot behind a building” and then “fled from the scene of the 
action.”48
When the militia line was broken, Morris found that his posi­
tion was outflanked; his crew had to set fire to the Adams and flee 
across the narrow Souadabscock River to save themselves. 
Morris and his men then fled overland to the Kennebec Valley 
and onward to Portsmouth.49
The skirmish was over in less than a half hour. The capture of the 
Penobscot had cost the British one man killed, eight wounded, and 
one missing. Blake’s losses were one killed, eleven wounded, and 
about eighty captured on the field of battle. Losses to the crew of 
the Adams were one marine killed and one seaman captured.50 The 
British continued their advance to Bangor where they engaged in 
plundering. Joseph Leavitt wrote that “scarcely was there a house 
or store but that suffered more or less—many stripped of all.”51 
The British withdrew from Bangor and Hampden on September 5, 
after burning shipping and extracting bonds to the value of $42,000 
from the citizens, to guarantee the delivery of ships to the British at 
Castine. Eleven of the ships which were not burned were confis­
cated by the British and taken to Castine.52
The occupation of eastern Maine was completed with the 
capture of Machias a few days later. Sherbrooke and Griffith 
returned to Halifax on September 18, taking half of the armed 
forces personnel with them. In general, the invasion of eastern 
Maine had been undertaken with an excellent command 
relationship between the army and navy. But it was unfortunate 
for the British that such a substantial force was not used to attack 
deeper into New England.
The remainder of Maine, west of the Penobscot, was equally 
defenseless. A discouraged Bangor resident named Joseph 
Williamson described the potential of the British invasion force:
Nothing hinders their ascending your river [Kennebec] in the same manner, 
completely conquering every town. After the)' have done this, they can with 
equal ease conquer all of the District of Maine and New Hampshire, for the 
enemy have [sic] troops and a navy for all these conquests.53
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W illiamson implied that the lethargy of the Maine people in 
defending themselves contributed to the British success. Even 
Governor Sherbrooke noted that the "more wealthy of the inhabi­
tants are really desirous of changing their present form of govern­
ment.”54
Confusion was the order of the day in western Maine and 
Massachusetts. Rumors mushroomed into predictions that the 
British had ordered 15,000 German mercenaries to subdue Cape 
Cod and Cape Ann, with Boston as the eventual objective.55 
Despite the anticipated danger, Governor Strong refused the 
request of General Dearborn to mobilize the militia. He informed 
Dearborn that the Massachusetts General Court had to be 
consulted before funds could be spent on the activation of the 
militia. Other than calling for a General Court Session for October 
5 and ordering work done on Boston’s fortifications, he did 
nothing.56
Even though Strong refused to call out the militia, many of the 
units responded to mobilization orders from their regimental 
commanders. According to one newspaper, nearly 5,000 militia 
were gathered at Portland by September 12.57 From available 
accounts, the militia were low in morale and poorly led. In August, 
one regiment resisted an order to take up defensive positions in 
Portland which had been manned previously by Federal troops.5S 
Another crisis was precipitated by a brigade commander who 
refused to activate his unit when ordered to do so by his superior 
officer.59 The shortage of arms and ammunition was another 
problem; a year earlier the Secretary of W ar had cancelled the 
scheduled weapons shipments to the Massachusetts militia.60 The 
disorder was duly noted by W illiam Sumner, Strong’s special agent 
during the emergency:
The accounts which Adjutant General Brooks received from the District 
of Maine were so confused and contradictory, that he could not deduce from 
them the true state of affairs in any threatened position, nor advise the 
governor what means were to be adopted, or what number of troops should 
be stationed in any such locality'.61
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Sumner was the only person able to create some semblance of 
order in the District of Maine. Traveling up the coast from Boston, 
Sumner organized 400 militia for the defense of the Portsmouth 
Navy Yard. Noting that the York County militia were in utter 
confusion, he proceeded to Portland, where he placed 1,100 militia 
under Federal command at Fort Burroughs. At Wiscasset he was 
helpful in settling a slight disagreement between Dearborn and 
William King, the commander of the 11th Division of Militia. A 
compromise was negotiated and King allowed two batallions of 
militia to serve under Federal command, but only if they were 
organized in militia fashion.62 Although Sumner was moderately 
successful in calming some of the discord in the District, the 
situation had deteriorated to such an extent that no single 
individual could have solved the many-faceted problems 
involving coastal defense.
By mid September requests began pouring in from townships to 
send the militia home, resulting in a general deactivation later in 
the month. At this time desertions exceeded enlistments. One 
militia officer was so desperate for recruits that he enlisted 
deserters from the British garrison at Castine, whom he considered 
to be “good lively fellows.”63 By the first of October an adequate 
defense of the coast was impossible if the British landed in force or 
chose to bombard the seaports.
Not only were Governor Strong and other prominent Fedralists 
disposed to allow the British occupation of eastern Maine, they 
were ready to concede parts of the conquered salient to British 
annexation.64 The Federalists were more concerned about 
organizing the Hartford Convention in an effort to humiliate the 
Federal government than they were about defending the District 
of Maine from invasion.
The defenseless situation of Maine and the unwillingness of 
Governor Strong to mobilize forces to recapture eastern Maine 
caused bitter indignation among a large number of the District's 
politicians. In mid-October a group of Republicans from Maine 
asked the Massachusetts General Court to look into the potentiality 
of driving the British out of Maine. The General Court neglected to 
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take action, much to the anger of the Republican faction in the 
District. Naturally, this refusal of the General Court to look after 
the interests of Maine caused many of the District’s people to feel 
increasingly alienated from Massachusetts.65
The Federal government made the next move in considering an 
expedition to force the British out of Maine territory. In 
November, Acting Secretary of War James Monroe let it be known 
that troops could be found by forcing the militia to serve under 
Federal command. Though Monroe thought the expedition an 
“object of greatest importance,” General Dearborn was 
pessimistic. “Against regular troops, strongly posted,” Dearborn 
wrote, “we cannot confide in the militia, unless their numbers are 
very superior to that of the enemy. We remember the unfortunate 
Penobscot expedition of the Revolution.”66
Nevertheless, William King, proposed commander of the 
expedition, met with Governor Strong in late November to plan 
for the campaign. Strong put a damper on the proposal and the 
expedition never reached the advanced planning stage. Worse still, 
the plan was leaked to a Boston newspaper and the British soon 
learned of the scheme.67
The refusal of Strong to act on King’s behalf was a blessing in 
that the proposed expedition had little chance for success. A year 
earlier the contract system for supply had broken down in New 
England, meaning that a large military force operating in Maine 
could not have subsisted unless supplied by sea from areas of 
agricultural surplus.68 Loss of command of the sea ruled out the 
possibility of logistical support along the Atlantic sea lanes. 
Moreover, William King had little actual military experience.
In the meantime, the British chose to consolidate rather than to 
expand their conquests in eastern Maine. Having interpreted the 
situation poorly from across the Atlantic, the British government 
believed that the Americans had the strength to recapture eastern 
Maine whenever they wished. Surprisingly unaware of the military 
impotency of the Americans in New England, the British agreed to 
return the conquered region at the conference table at Ghent, 
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where negotiations were in progress. Even the Duke of Wellington 
thought the conquest “only temporary/' and Henry Gouldburn, 
one of the British negotiators, believed that the Americans would 
“fight hard” to get possession of the islands in Passamaquoddy 
Bay.69Apparently neither the Duke nor Gouldbum knew that the 
Americans had no naval and military forces to recapture the lost 
territory.
Fortunately for New England, the British suffered setbacks at 
Baltimore and Plattsburg. Failure to occupy important portions of 
American territory, compounded with domestic difficulties and a 
Russian threat from the east, caused Britain to compromise at the 
conference table. After tedious negotiations, a status quo 
antebellum peace was signed and eastern Maine was returned to 
the United States.
The loss of eastern Maine during the War of 1812 is a sad chapter 
in the State’s history. It is regretable that it was American military 
and naval successes outside of the District which brought about the 
restoration of eastern Maine rather than the people of 
Massachusetts and the District of Maine who did next to nothing to 
gain back the lost territory. On the other hand, British strategic 
blunders spared the District of Maine from a much more 
damaging invasion which could have encompassed all of Maine 
had the British used the military and naval power at their disposal. 
Furthermore, the Maine people came to realize that the union with 
Massachusetts was impractical and undesirable, and the move 
toward statehood began in earnest.
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A NEW LOOK AT THE INVASION OF EASTERN MAINE, 1814 
A COMMENT
BY RONALD F. BANKS
I would like to begin my remarks by commending Barry for his 
continuing fine work on this subject. His paper is well written and 
meets the high standards he set earlier in his M.A. thesis. In 
preparing for my assignment, I reviewed my own extensive 
collection of notes on this subject. After doing so, I concluded that 
Barry’s paper stands up well in respect to its factual content. There 
are additional sources he might profitably check out before his 
paper is published. But even so, I find his paper accurate in its 
essential data.
I will therefore devote my comments to his main thesis, which is, 
as I read it, that England made a strategic blunder in the summer 
and fall of 1814, by not occupying more of Maine, indeed, more of 
New England than it actually did. He contends that the military 
unpreparedness of New England generally, and of Massachusetts, 
and Maine in particular, made the area easy prey to British invasion 
and occupation. Had England not over-estimated both the means 
and will to resist of New Englanders, she could have occupied a 
great deal more than eastern Maine and thereby knocked New 
England out of the war. Moreover, she would have placed herself 
in a much stronger position at Ghent to extract accession of eastern 
Maine as part of the peace settlement. Failure to take full 
advantage of her military superiority in this part of the country 
was, Barry contends, a strategic error.
Comment on this thesis or any thesis for that matter has its 
difficulties. One finds himself considering “iffy” questions which 
involve one in what is now called counter-history. In such an 
exercise, one is called upon to defend the historical validity of what 
might have been. This can be a valuable exercise, but one must 
always keep in mind that it is an essentially speculative exericse.
Nevertheless, in respect to Barry’s thesis, I offer the following 
observations:
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First, I will concede that the British could have taken some 
additional territory with relative ease, but probably not beyond 
the Kennebec River. They could have bombarded Portland, 
Portsmouth, and Boston, but had they tried to invade the territory 
west and south of the Kennebec, I believe they would have faced 
much stiffer resistance than they did in eastern Maine, and that 
ultimately they would have failed to achieve an occupation. I say 
this because south of the Kennebec River the population was much 
larger with far greater resources at hand than in eastern Maine. 
There were, also, far greater numbers who would have fought to 
preserve their independence. The forces the British assembled to 
occupy eastern Maine were small in number—at most 2,500 as I 
recall—and many of them were mercenaries, certainly not a force 
large enough to conquer areas where strenuous resistance could be 
expected. After all, in August and September 1814, in excess of 
5,000 militia were mobilized to guard the Maine coast west of the 
Kennebec River, and in October 1814, the Massachusetts General 
Court made available $1,000,000 to provide for further defense of 
the Massachusetts coastline. Despite the opposition to the war in 
Massachusetts, the people drew the line well before the thought of 
permitting a British occupation without fierce resistance.
Even so, to have successfully occupied much more of New 
England than they did would have required a greatly augmented 
force. Such additions would have had to come from manpower in 
both the Chesapeake Bay and upper New York theatres of the war, 
thus jeopardizing their campaigns in those areas, campaigns 
which, were they successful, would have resulted in far more 
important strategic results than would have occurred had a greater 
part of New England fallen to occupation.
Second, if an important object of occupying a larger portion of 
Maine and points south was to take New England out of the war, 
then the strategy should have been the one Cochrane 
recommended: i.e., to cut New England and northern New York 
off from the middle and southern states. Certainly, the risks of 
adopting a strategy of occupation to achieve this objective far 
outweighed the advantages to be gained. For, in reality, New 
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England had never been in the war. She had followed three years 
of denying the Madison administration both her manpower and 
treasure, and it is clear she meant to persist in this stance. 
Therefore, the best strategy toward her was one of salutary 
neglect. As one Mainer put it to General Sherbrooke, “New 
England can be conquered by kindness.”
In addition, to have advanced beyond the Penobscot or perhaps 
the Kennebec in 1814 would have produced a change in the 
attitude of New Englanders. As I suggested earlier, they may have 
hated the war, but they hated the thought of an occupation even 
more. They were willing to withhold their men and treasure from 
the cause as long as the war did not impose great hardships on 
them, but they would have fought to defend their homes and their 
families from an occupation.
My point is that England might have been able to occupy more 
territory, but in so doing it is difficult to see how her strategic 
position would have been improved. Indeed, I should think it 
would have been worsened considerably by producing quite a 
different military situation in New England than had developed 
otherwise.
Third, you may ask, why do I feel so strongly that Mainers and 
others in New England would have put up such a resistance. They 
seemed indifferent to the fate of eastern Maine. How do we know 
that they would have reacted differently to a greater British 
occupation? I have given some reasons which I believe are valid, 
but you must also remember that eastern Maine was unique, in that 
from the earlier days of our history it was a disputed territory. In 
1783 the British only reluctantly surrendered sovereignty over it, 
much to the consternation of New Brunswickians. Besides, Barry is 
correct when he says it was an area difficult to defend due to its 
closeness to Canada and nearly impossible to recapture due to 
British superiority on the water. In was not only Governor Strong 
who felt the proposed expeditionary force to drive the Briths from 
Castine was folly, but Henry Dearborn himself. The same could 
not be said for the rest of Maine south of the Kennebec, or of New 
England generally.
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Finally, I think Barry and I differ on the conclusion that the 
occupation of eastern Maine made sense to the British. I believe 
what they took was about all they could have taken without 
creating additional serious problems for themselves. He believes 
they should have taken much more to strengthen their hand at 
Ghent. Obviously, I feel that a more ambitious strategy of 
occupation would not have changed the outcome at Ghent. 
England’s decision to accept the status quo ante bellum had to do 
with problems she was encountering at home and on the continent 
in addition to her inability to control the Great Lakes here in 
America. A bolder strategy in New England would not have 
changed this larger reality.
And, of course, the overriding reality was that with the defeat of 
Napoleon any compelling reasons for further conflict were lifted. 
A continuation of the war, in the hope of such marginal gains as 
would be represented in a possible cession of eastern Maine, 
would have bordered on the chimerical if not the irrational.
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